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ABSTRACT. We examine a model in which buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite
sequence of auctions. In each period, a new buyer probabilistically arrives to the market, and is
endowed with a constant private value. We demonstrate by way of a simple example the inefficiency
of the second-price sealed-bid auction in this setting, and therefore focus instead on the ascending
auction.
We then show that the mechanism in which the objects are sold via ascending auctions has an
efficient, fully revealing, and Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium which is ex post optimal for all
buyers in each period, given their expectations about the future. In equilibrium, all buyers com-
pletely reveal their private information in every period. However, equilibrium bidding behavior is
memoryless. Bids depend only upon the information revealed in the current auction, and not on
any information revealed in previous periods. This lack of memory is crucial, as it allows buyers to
behave symmetrically, despite the informational asymmetry arising from the arrival of uninformed
buyers. This provides the appropriate incentives for these new buyers to also reveal their informa-
tion.
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INFORMATION REVELATION IN SEQUENTIAL ASCENDING AUCTIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
Many markets, including those for art, wine, government-issued debt, and timber and other
natural resources sell multiple objects via sequential auctions, while eBay has built a market cap-
italization of over $40 billion by providing a marketplace for these auctions. In this paper, we
examine a model of such markets in which a single object is sold at a time and new buyers ar-
rive on the market at random times. Each bidder has an independently drawn private value for
purchasing an object. In contrast to much of the literature that makes use of sealed-bid auctions,
we focus on the ascending auction. Although the various auction formats are in many respects
equivalent in a static private-values setting, this equivalence does not hold in a dynamic environ-
ment, primarily due to the information revelation inherent in the ascending auction format. The
difference between the two formats is further exacerbated in the sequential auction setting when
we allow for dynamically changing populations of buyers. In particular, the entry of a new buyer
introduces an additional informational asymmetry. We show, however, that this asymmetry may
be easily resolved by employing ascending auctions. In equilibrium, each buyer’s bids and pay-
offs depend only on the buyer’s rank amongst their current competitors and the (revealed) values
of those opponents with lower values. Furthermore, these strategies have the remarkable prop-
erty of being memoryless—in each auction conducted, bids are independent of the information
revealed in previous periods, despite the fact that all private information is revealed during every
auction.
We feel that this model serves as a useful abstraction of online auction sites such as eBay or uBid,
especially when considering the extensive market on these sites for individual units of brand-new
homogenous goods. Typically, a variety of auctions for identical items are open simultaneously,
but may be ordered by their closing time. Thus, abstracting away from intra-auction dynamics,
a sequential auction model yields a good approximation.1 With this in mind, many authors (see
Sailer (2006) or Zeithammer (2006), for instance) make use of the second-price sealed-bid auction,
citing evidence from Roth and Ockenfels (2002) and Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) about the preva-
lence of “sniping” (last-second bidding) in online auctions in defense of their modeling choice.
However, as shown by Cai, Wurman, and Chao (2007), pure-strategy symmetric equilibria do
not exist in sequential sealed-bid auctions when buyer values are fixed across time and bids are
made publicly observable after each auction. As most online auctions bear a close resemblance to
English auctions in regards to intra-auction dynamics as well as the visibility of submitted bids
(both during an auction and after an auction has closed), we believe that the ascending auction is
better-suited than the sealed-bid second-price auction for modeling online auction markets.2
What is more, we feel that the sequential ascending auction is important for another, indepen-
dent, reason. Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) demonstrate the suitability of sequential ascending
auctions as a simple way to provide for the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allo-
cation in a task scheduling problem. In particular, they provide an example in which sequential
1Nekipelov (2007) examines a different aspect of these markets, choosing to ignore the sequential nature of these auc-
tions in order to study within-auction dynamics.
2Either choice is, of course, a compromise, abstracting away important features of the real-world environment for the
sake of tractability.
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ascending auctions are equivalent to their dynamic generalization of the classic Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism.3 Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2007) generalize this mechanism to settings in
which agents may be “inaccessible” for periods of time. The present work complements these
papers, as we show that the sequential ascending auction serves as an (easily implemented and
understood) indirect mechanism that is equivalent to their direct mechanisms in a complex en-
vironment, and is therefore an incentive compatible mechanism for inducing socially efficient
choices.
The present work is closely related to several papers in the sequential auctions literature. Mil-
grom and Weber (2000) examine the properties of a variety of auction formats for the (simultane-
ous or sequential) sale of multiple objects with a fixed set of buyers and objects. In regards to the
ascending auction with private values, they show that, in equilibrium, buyers bid exactly their
values. However, they allow for neither discounting nor the entry of new buyers, features that
play a central role in our model. The vast majority of the literature following that work has cho-
sen to focus on sealed-bid auctions; for example, the previously referenced Sailer (2006) and Zei-
thammer (2006) conduct empirical studies of eBay auctions making use of sequential second-price
sealed-bid auctions and assumptions of an effectively static environment. Kittsteiner, Nikutta,
and Winter (2004) examine the role of discounting in sequential sealed-bid auctions, and prove a
revenue equivalence result for auctions in which the only information revealed is the valuations
of bidders who have already left the market. Meanwhile, Jeitschko (1998) considers a model of
first-price sealed-bid auctions in which winner’s bids are revealed, allowing the remaining buy-
ers to update their beliefs about their opponents’ valuations. On the other hand, Cai, Wurman,
and Chao (2007) demonstrate the nonexistence of pure-strategy symmetric equilibria in sealed-
bid sequential auction models in which all bids are revealed. The only paper that we are aware of
that examines sequential ascending auctions is that of Caillaud and Mezzetti (2004), who examine
reserve prices in a model with a sequence of only two auctions.
Certain papers within the literature on bargaining with incomplete information are also related
to our model. Inderst (2008) considers a bargaining model in which a seller is randomly visited
by heterogeneous buyers. If the seller is currently engaged in bargaining with one agent when
another arrives, she may choose to switch from bargaining with one buyer to bargaining with
the other. However, this switch is permanent, implying that the arrival of a new buyer either
“restarts” the game or is completely irrelevant. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (forthcoming) take a different
approach: they consider an incomplete information bargaining problem between a buyer and a
seller, and allow for the possibility of the arrival of various “events.” These events end the game
and yield an exogenously determined expected payoff to each agent. The suggested interpretation
is that these events may be viewed as triggers for some sort of multi-lateral mechanism involving
new entrants (a second-price auction, for example) for which the expected payoffs are a reduced-
form representation. Thus, while both works are primarily concerned with characterizing the
endogenous option value that results from the potential arrival of additional participants to the
3Their example differs substantially from the present work, as it does not take into account the complications of random
buyer and seller arrivals, and hence is essentially a static problem.
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market, they do this in a framework of bilateral bargaining which fails to capture the dynamic
nature of direct competition between several current and future potential market participants.
In addition, we would be remiss in not noting the relationship between our model and that
of Peters and Severinov (2006). Also primarily motivated by auction markets such as eBay, their
work considers a setting with multiple buyers and sellers interacting simultaneously. They find a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium that supports efficient trade at Vickrey prices; moreover, if the num-
bers of buyers and sellers are sufficiently large, then trade is also ex post efficient. While their
model has the advantage of considering the effects of competing auctions on the strategic behav-
ior of buyers and sellers, it does not take into account what we believe are two key features of
the markets in question (and the two key features of our model): auctions are conducted asyn-
chronously, and new agents arrive on the market at random times.
To this end, Nekipelov (2007) models entry during a single ascending auction in order to study
entry deterrence and within-auction price dynamics. On the other hand, Said (2008) examines the
role of random entry in a model of sequential second-price auctions in which objects are stochas-
tically equivalent; values are independently and identically distributed across both buyers and
objects. In the present work, however, buyers’ values are constant—each agent’s independent and
private value for the good does not vary over time. Since buyers’ values are not drawn anew in
each period, the information revealed in equilibrium becomes an important factor, affecting the
option value arising from participation in future auctions. In particular, not only are expected pay-
offs affected by the number of agents present on the market, but the realizations of their values
are integral to price determination as well.
The paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2, and then provide a
simple example in Section 3 that demonstrates some of the advantages of the ascending auction
format over the second-price sealed-bid auction in a dynamic setting with buyer entry. Section 4
solves for the equilibrium in our model with buyer entry and demonstrates some of its desirable
properties. In Section 5, we discuss the relationship between our model and the dynamic Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. MODEL
We consider a market in which time is discrete; periods are indexed by t ∈ N. There is a
finite number nt of risk-neutral buyers on the market in any given period t. Each buyer i ∈
{1, . . . , nt} has a valuation vi for a single unit of the good in question, where vi is drawn from the
distribution F with continuous density f and support V := [0, v]. We assume that valuations are
private information, and are independently and identically distributed across buyers. Moreover,
additional buyers may arrive on the market in each period. We will assume that at most one
new buyer arrives in any given period, and that this arrival occurs with some exogenously given
probability q ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, we assume that all buyers discount the future exponentially with
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
In each period, there is exactly one object available for sale via an ascending (English) auction.
The auction begins with the price at zero and all bidders participating in the auction. Each bidder
may choose any price at which to drop out of the auction. This exit decision is irreversible (in
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the current period), and is observable by all agents currently present in the market. Finally, the
auction ends whenever exactly 1 active bidder remains, and the price paid by this winning bidder
is the price at which the last exit occurred. Note that we assume that the number of active bidders
is commonly known throughout the auction.4 With this in mind, each bidder’s decision problem
within a given period is not to choose a single bid, but rather a sequence of functions, each of which
is a exit price contingent on the (observed) exit prices of the bidders who have already dropped
out of the current auction.
Throughout, we will denote by yˆ the ordered vector of realized values for those buyers currently
present on the market, where
yˆ1 > yˆ2 > · · · > yˆnt .
Furthermore, for any k, n ∈ N such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we will denote by Vk,n(yˆ) the expected payoff
at the beginning of a period (before any entry has occurred) of the buyer with the k-th highest of
n values. For example, if there are three bidders present, with v2 > v3 > v1, then yˆ = {v2, v3, v1},
bidder 1’s payoff is V3,3(yˆ), bidder 2’s payoff is V1,3(yˆ), and bidder 3’s payoff is V2,3(yˆ).
3. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Suppose that there are two buyers on the market with values v1, v2 ∈ [0, 1], where, without loss
of generality, we assume that v1 > v2. In addition, a third potential buyer with value v3 ∼ F,
where F is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] may enter the market with some exogenously given
probability q ∈ [0, 1]. For simplicity, we assume that new entry may occur only in the initial period.
Each buyer wishes to purchase exactly one unit of an object which is being sold via a sequence
of auctions. All buyers discount time with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore,
we make the assumption that v1 and v2 are commonly known amongst all buyers, which may
be viewed as the result of information being revealed via bidding behavior in some (unmodeled)
previous periods. On the other hand, the new entrant’s value (assuming she arrives on the market
in the first period) is her own private information. We will consider two variants of this example;
first, we will assume that objects are sold via second-price auctions in which the buyers’ bids are
revealed after each round, and then we will assume that objects are sold via ascending auctions.
3.1. Second-Price Auction
We begin with the second-price auction. Note that in any round in which there is only one
bidder present, that bidder receives the object at a price of zero, regardless of her bid. Therefore,
if there are two bidders present in the second period, each bidder i has an option value of δvi
from losing. Thus, regardless of the information that each bidder has about the other, it is weakly
dominant for each bidder to submit a bid of their true value less their option value—the optimal
bid for each bidder i is (1− δ)vi. Thus, denoting the payoff of a bidder in the second round when
4This assumption is a consequence of the standard Milgrom and Weber (1982) “button auction” approach to modeling
English auctions.
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there are two bidders present as U(vi, vj), we have
(1) U(vi, vj) =
vi − (1− δ)vj, if vi > vj;δvi, if vi ≤ vj.
Note that, using this expression, we may write the payoff of a lone bidder with value vi as U(vi, 0).
Now consider the third bidder (when present). Under the assumption that bidder 1 bids a
greater amount than bidder 2 (that is, that b1 > b2), the third bidder faces a choice between win-
ning the auction and receiving a payoff of v3 − b1 or losing the auction and facing bidder 2 in
the next period, yielding a payoff of δU(v3, v2). Thus, bidder 3 prefers to win if, and only if,
v3 − b1 ≥ δU(v3, v2), or, equivalently, b1 ≤ v3 − δU(v3, v2). She can then win the auction if, and
only if, it is optimal for her to do so by bidding
(2) b3(v3) = v3 − δU(v3, v2) =
(1− δ)v3 + δ(1− δ)v2, if v3 > v2;(1− δ2)v3, if v3 ≤ v2.
Note that b3 is strictly increasing in v3, and hence fully identifies bidder 3’s valuation in the next
period when bids are revealed. For convenience, we will denote by u1 and u2 the values of bidder
3 that submit bids equal to those of bidders 1 and 2, respectively; that is,
u1 := b−13 (b1) and u2 := b
−1
3 (b2).
Now consider the case of bidder 2’s bid in the first period of the game. If she submits a winning
bid in the first period, she receives a payoff of v2 − b∗, where b∗ is the highest competing bid
that she faces. On the other hand, if she loses the first-round auction, she receives a payoff of
δE[U(v2, v∗)], where
v∗ =

0, with probability 1− q;
v3, with probability qF(u1);
v1, with probability q (1− F(u1)) .
Thus, bidder 2 prefers to win if, and only if, v2 − b∗ ≥ δE[U(v2, v∗)]. She may then guarantee that
she wins only when it is desirable to do so by bidding
b2 = v2 − δE[U(v2, v∗)]
= v2 − δ
[
(1− q)v2 + q (1− F(u1)) δv2
+q
∫ v2
0 (v2 − (1− δ)v3) dF(v3) + q
∫ u1
v2
δv2 dF(v3)
]
= (1− δ)(1+ δq)v2 − (1− δ)δq v
2
2
2
.(3)
Finally, let us consider buyer 1’s bidding behavior in the first period of the game. Note first that
u2 < v2 < v1, implying that if bidder 1 loses today, she will definitely win the auction in the next
period. To see this, note that if bidder 3 enters and wins the first round, bidder 1 faces v2 < v1 in
the next period. On the other hand, if bidder 2 is the high bidder in the first round, then bidder 1
is either alone or faces v3 < u2 < v1 in the second round. Thus, when the high opponent bid is b∗,
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FIGURE 1. Initial bids when v1 = 23 , v2 =
1
3 , v3 ∼ U[0, 1], δ = 910 , and q = 14 .
winning yields bidder 1 a payoff of v1 − b∗, while losing yields a payoff of δU(v1, v∗), where
v∗ =

0, with probability 1− q;
v3, with probability qF(u2);
v2, with probability q (1− F(u2)) .
Thus, similar to the cases of bidders 2 and 3, bidder 1 may guarantee that she wins only when it
is desirable for her to do so by bidding
b1 = v1 − δE[U(v1, v∗)] = v1 − δ
[
(1− q)v1 + δq (1− F(u2)) (v1 − (1− δ)v2)
+q
∫ u2
0 (v1 − (1− δ)v′) dF(v′)
]
.
Recall that u2 = b−13 (b2) < v2, implying that u2 = b2/(1− δ2). Combining this with the assump-
tion that F(x) = x implies that
u2 =
b2
1− δ2 =
1+ δq
1+ δ
v2 − δq1+ δ
v22
2
.
Thus, we may conclude that
b1 = (1− δ)v1 + (1− δ)δqv2
− δ(1− δ)(1+ δq)(1+ δ(2− q))qv
2
2
2(1+ δ)2
+
δ3(1− δ)(1− q)q2v32
2(1+ δ)2
+
δ3(1− δ)q3v42
8(1+ δ)2
.
(4)
For clarity, Figure 1 plots the bids of all three buyers for fixed parameter values.5 The key fea-
tures to note are that u1 < v1 and u2 < v2; use of the second-price auction in this context may
lead to inefficient outcomes, as “low” values of bidder 3 may outbid bidders 1 and 2 despite their
having higher values. This result is driven by two main features of our setting: first, agents dis-
count the future and hence the order in which objects are allocated matters; and second, there is
a fundamental asymmetry in information—bidder 3’s value is private information, while the val-
ues of bidders 1 and 2 are commonly known. Thus, in addition to the nonexistence of symmetric
equilibria in sequential second-price sealed-bid auctions as demonstrated by Cai, Wurman, and
5The qualitative features of the equilibrium do not depend on these parameter values. Moreover, the result remains
true even if the presence of the new entrant is made common knowledge or contingent bidding is used. This may be
easily seen by examing the bids of buyers 1 and 2 in the cases where q = 0 and q = 1.
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Chao (2007), allowing for the entry of new buyers may induce inefficient outcomes, even in the
asymmetric equilibria of the sequential auction game.
3.2. Ascending Auction
We now demonstrate that the ascending auction does not share the inefficiency of the second-
price auction in this setting. Note that when there are only two bidders present, the losing bidder
is guaranteed a payoff of δvi in the next period. Therefore, bidders are willing to remain active in
an auction until the price reaches (1− δ)vi. Thus, the expected payoff of a bidder when she has
only one opponent present on the market is given by U(vi, vj) from Equation 1.
When there are three bidders present, matters are slightly different. In particular, the very na-
ture of an ascending auction immediately reveals to all bidders the number of participants. Thus,
bidder 3 is unable to keep private her presence on the market. This implies that, in a symmetric
equilibrium, the first bidder to drop out of the auction knows that they have the lowest value
among three bidders, and will not be allocated an object until the third period, yielding an ex-
pected payoff of δ2vi. Thus, each of the three bidders remains active until the price reaches
(1− δ2)vi.
Denoting by yˆ3 the lowest of the three values, the two remaining bidders now know that they
are guaranteed a payoff of U(vi, yˆ3) in the following period, and are hence willing to remain
active until they are indifferent between winning at the current price and winning the object in the
following period; that is, until the price reaches
(1− δ)vi + δ(1− δ)yˆ3.
Notice that these cutoff prices are strictly increasing in each bidder’s value, and hence are both
efficient and fully revealing.6 Thus, we have established that the ascending auction does not suffer
from the same shortcomings as the second-price auction in this relatively simple setting. We will
therefore focus exclusively on the ascending auction from this point forward. Moreover, we will
relax the assumption that new entry may occur only once—a new buyer may arrive on the market
in any period.
4. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
4.1. Preliminaries and Equilibrium Strategies
One of the most critical features of the equilibrium that we construct in this model is that buyer’s
bids and payoffs do not depend upon the valuations of higher-ranked bidders (neither in expec-
tation nor realization), even if that information is publicly available. Recall that yˆ is the ordered
vector of realized buyer valuations, where
yˆ1 > · · · > yˆn,
6In addition, it is straightforward to verify that these strategies do, in fact, constitute an equilibrium. Conditional
on participation, no bidder wishes to deviate from these strategies. Furthermore, no bidder wishes to postpone their
participation to a future period.
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and that we denote by Vk,n(yˆ) the expected payoff at the beginning of a period (before any entry
has occurred) of the buyer with the k-th highest of n values. To show the property described
above, we will show that (abusing notation slightly) we may write
Vk,n(yˆ1, . . . , yˆn) = Vk,n(yˆk, . . . , yˆn).
A formal statement of this result may be found in the subsequent section; in the meantime, we
will describe the equilibrium taking this property as a given.
Suppose that an auction is in progress with n bidders with (ordered) values yˆ. When all bidders
are still active, a bidder with valuation vi who drops out of the bidding learns (and reveals) that,
in equilibrium, she has the lowest value; that is, that yˆn = vi. Therefore, her expected payoff in the
next period is Vn−1,n−1(vi), as at the beginning of the next period, before a new entrant may arrive,
there will be n− 1 bidders present (the current period’s n bidders less the winning buyer) and she
will have the lowest value. Therefore, each bidder i should remain in the auction until the current
price p is such that
vi − p = δVn−1,n−1(vi).
At this price, bidder i is indifferent between purchasing the object today and waiting until the next
period when i will be the lowest-valued buyer. Thus, when no one has dropped out, bidder i will
remain in the auction until the price reaches
(5) βn,n(vi) := vi − δVn−1,n−1(vi).
Once someone drops out of the auction, the remaining n− 1 bidders learn the realization of yˆn
and that they are not the lowest-valued competitor.7 Therefore, the next bidder (with value vj) to
drop out reveals herself to be the second-lowest of the n bidders; therefore, her expected payoff in
the next period is Vn−2,n−1(vj, yˆn), as she will be the second-lowest of the n− 1 buyers remaining
in the following period. Thus, each bidder j who has not already dropped out should remain in
the auction until the current price p is such that she is indifferent between purchasing the object
in the present period and waiting until the next period—that is, when
vj − p = δVn−2,n−1(vj, yˆn).
Thus, when only one bidder has dropped out, bidder j remains in the auction until the price
reaches
(6) βn−1,n(vj, yˆn) := vj − δVn−2,n−1(vj, yˆn).
Proceeding inductively, we define for each k = 2, . . . , n the bidding function
(7) βk,n(vi, yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn) := vi − δVk−1,n−1(vi, yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn).
These bidding functions define the drop-out points for a bidder with value vi when there are k
buyers still active in the auction. Notice that this implies that the final price in this auction will be
β2,n(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn) = yˆ2 − δV1,n−1(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn).
7This of course requires βn,n to be invertible, something that we will verify in short order.
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Keep in mind, however, that we must verify that these bid functions are invertible (so that values
are revealed), and also that these bidding strategies indeed form an equilibrium. This requires a
characterization of the expected payoff functions Vk,n.
4.2. Payoff Functions
As a preview of our results, consider first the case of a lone buyer present on the market at the
beginning of a period with valuation v1, and that a second buyer may arrive with probability q.
Once the price clock starts rising, it is immediately revealed whether there are one or two bidders
present. Thus, there is no asymmetric information regarding the number of active bidders.
Note that if the second bidder does not arrive, the lone bidder receives the object for free. In the
case of two bidders present, however, each bidder i = 1, 2 will stay in the auction until the price
rises to β2,2(vi) = vi − δV1,1(vi). Thus,
V1,1(v1) = (1− q)v1 + q
[∫ v1
0
(
v1 − β2,2(v′)
)
dF(v′) +
∫ v
v1
δV1,1(v1) dF(v′)
]
.
The first term in this expression is bidder 1’s payoff if she is alone on the market. The second term
is her expected payoff if a second bidder arrives, and is the sum of her expected winnings if the
second bidder has a lower value than her and her expected continuation payoff if she loses the
auction. Differentiation of this expression with respect to v1 and substituting for β2,2(v1) yields
V ′1,1(v1) =
1− q(1− F(v1))
1− δq(1− F(v1)) .
Note that we can rewrite this expression as
V ′1,1(v1) =
∞
∑
t=0
(δq(1− F(v1)))t [1− q(1− F(v1))],
which is the summation of the expected per-period gain from a marginal increase in v1, discounted
by the probability of that gain being realized in any given period.
Note that, since F is continuous, V ′1,1 is also a continuous function. Furthermore, we have
V1,1(0) = 0, implying by way of the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus that
(8) V1,1(vi) = V1,1(0) +
∫ vi
0
V ′1,1(v
′) dv′ =
∫ vi
0
1− q(1− F(v′))
1− δq(1− F(v′)) dv
′.
Note that 0 < V ′1,1(v
′) ≤ 1 for all v′ ∈ V. Hence, V1,1 is strictly increasing, as is β2,2.
Proceeding inductively, we arrive at the following
PROPOSITION 1 (Existence and uniqueness of Vk,n).
Fix any n > 1, and suppose that the expected payoff to a buyer when a period starts with n − 1 bid-
ders present depends only on the rank of that bidder and the values of those with values lower than her;
that is, given (known) values yˆ ∈ Vn−1, the k-th highest of the n − 1 bidders receives expected payoff
Vk,n−1(yˆk, . . . , yˆn−1). Then the expected payoff of the k-th highest of n bidders, for all k = 1, . . . , n, is given
by Vk,n(yˆk, . . . , yˆn). Furthermore, given {Vk,n−1}n−1k=1 , the functions {Vk,n}nk=1 are uniquely determined.
Proof. The proof may be found in Appendix A. 
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Thus, the strategies in Equation 7 lead to well-defined and unique value functions for the buy-
ers. In addition, following these strategies implies that these expected payoffs do not depend
upon the bids or prices paid in any previous periods, but instead depend only upon the values of
those currently present buyers ranked below a bidder.
We are also able to use the indifference inherent in the definition of our conjectured equilibrium
strategy in order to illustrate the link between the various payoff functions. In particular, we have
the following
PROPOSITION 2 (Relationship between Vk,n and V1,n).
Fix any n ∈ N. Then for all k = 1, . . . , n, the expected payoff to the k-th ranked of n buyer is equal to that
of the highest-ranked buyer when she is tied with k− 1 of her opponents; that is,
Vk,n(yˆk, . . . , yˆn) = V1,n(yˆk, . . . , yˆk, yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn).
Proof. The proof may be found in Appendix A. 
As mentioned above, this result makes heavy use of the indifference conditions built into the
bidding strategies described in Equation 7, and in particular the indifference of the buyer with the
second-highest value. This bidder drops out at a price at which she is indifferent between winning
immediately or waiting one period. Unsurprisingly, when the top two buyers have the same
value, they must receive the same payoff, regardless of the tie-breaking rule used to determine
which one of the two should receive the object when they drop out simultaneously. The intuition
behind the relationship between lower-ranked buyers’ payoff functions is analogous. Moreover,
Proposition 2 implies that knowledge of the functions {V1,n}∞n=1 is sufficient to determine the
remaining value functions. Thus, define the function λ : V→ [0, 1] by
(9) λ(v) := δ
1− q(1− F(v))
1− δq(1− F(v)) .
We have the following
PROPOSITION 3 (Characterization of Vk,n).
For all n ∈N and all k = 1, . . . , n,
(10) Vk,n(yˆ) = δ−1
n
∑
j=k
∫ yˆj
yˆj+1
λj(v′) dv′,
where we take yˆn+1 := 0.
Proof. Note that we may write V1,n(yˆ) as
V1,n(yˆ) = (1− q) [yˆ1 − β2,n(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn)]
+ q
[
n−1
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
(
yˆ1 − β2,n+1( ˆˆy−1(v′))
)
dF(v′)
+
∫ v
yˆ1
δV1,n(yˆ) dF(v′)
]
,
(11)
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where ˆˆy(v′) is the ordered vector that arises from adding v′ to yˆ. We will denote by V(j)1,n the partial
derivative of V1,n with respect to its j-th argument. Differentiation with respect to yˆ1 then implies
that
V(1)1,n (yˆ) = 1− q(1− F(yˆ1)) + δq(1− F(yˆ1))V(1)1,n (yˆ)
= δ−1λ(yˆ1).
Notice that this result is independent of n. Furthermore, note that this implies that V(j)1,n (yˆ) does
not depend on yˆ1 for any j 6= 1; equivalently, for all n ∈N,
V(1,j)1,n (yˆ) = 0 for all yˆ ∈ Vn and j 6= 1.
Differentiating Equation 11 with respect to yˆ2 now leads to
V(2)1,n (yˆ) = − (1− q(1− F(yˆ2)) + δ(1− q)V(1)1,n−1(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn)
+ δq
n−2
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
V(1)1,n ( ˆˆy−1(v
′)) dF(v′)
+ δq
∫ yˆ1
yˆ2
V(2)1,n (v
′, yˆ2, . . . , yˆn) dF(v′) + δq(1− F(yˆ1))V(2)1,n (yˆ)
Note first that ∫ yˆ1
yˆ2
V(2)1,n (v
′, yˆ2, . . . , yˆn) dF(v′) = (F(yˆ1)− F(yˆ2))V(2)1,n (yˆ)
since V(1,2)1,n = 0. Moreover,
n−2
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
V(1)1,n ( ˆˆy−1(v
′)) dF(v′) =
n−2
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
δ−1λ(yˆ2) dF(v′)
=
∫ yˆ2
0
δ−1λ(yˆ2) dF(v′) = δ−1λ(yˆ2)F(yˆ2).
Thus, we have
V(2)1,n (yˆ) =
− (1− q(1− F(yˆ2))) + (1− q(1− F(yˆ2))) λ(yˆ2)
1− δq(1− F(yˆ2))
=
1− q(1− F(yˆ2))
1− δq(1− F(yˆ2)) (λ(yˆ2)− 1) = δ
−1 (λ2(yˆ2)− λ(yˆ2)) .
Note that, similar to the case of V(1)1,n , V
(2)
1,n depends only on the second argument of V1,n. Thus, for
all n ∈N,
V(2,j)1,n (yˆ) = 0 for all yˆ ∈ Vn and j 6= 2.
Proceeding inductively, fix any k ∈ {3, . . . , n} for arbitrary n ∈N, and suppose that
V(j)1,n (yˆ) = δ
−1
(
λj(yˆj)− λj−1(yˆj)
)
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for all j = 2, . . . , k− 1. Differentiating Equation 11 with respect to yˆk yields
V(k)1,n (yˆ) = δ(1− q)V(k−1)1,n−1 (yˆ2, . . . , yˆn) + δq
n−k
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
V(k−1)1,n ( ˆˆy−1(v
′)) dF(v′)
+ δq
n−1
∑
j=n−k+1
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
V(k)1,n ( ˆˆy−1(v
′)) dF(v′) + δq(1− F(yˆ1))V(k)1,n (yˆ).
Since V(k−1)1,n does not depend on any of its arguments but the (k− 1)-th,
n−k
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
V(k−1)1,n ( ˆˆy−1(v
′) dF(v′) = F(yˆk)V
(k−1)
1,n−1 (yˆ−1).
In addition, V(j,k)1,n = 0 for all j < k implies that
n−1
∑
j=n−k+1
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
V(k)1,n ( ˆˆy−1(v
′)) dF(v′) = (F(yˆ1)− F(yˆk))V(k)1,n (yˆ).
Thus, we have
V(k)1,n (yˆ) = δ(1− q)V(k−1)1,n−1 (yˆ−1) + δqF(yˆk)V(k−1)1,n−1 (yˆ−1) + δq(1− F(yˆk))V(k)1,n (yˆ)
= δ
1− q(1− F(yˆk))
1− δq(1− F(yˆk))V
(k−1)
1,n−1 (yˆ−1) = δ
−1
(
λk(yˆk)− λk−1(yˆk)
)
.
By induction, the above expression holds for all k = 2, . . . , n, where n ∈N is arbitrary.
Since λk is continuous for all k ∈N, we may use the the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus and
the boundary condition V1,n(0, . . . , 0) = 0 to show that
V1,n(yˆ) = V1,n(0, . . . , 0) +
n
∑
j=1
∫ yˆj
0
V(j)1,n (v
′) dv′ = δ−1
n
∑
j=1
[∫ yˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′ −
∫ yˆj+1
0
λj(v′) dv′
]
,
where we take yˆn+1 := 0. We may then make use of Proposition 2 and some arithmetic manipula-
tion in order to achieve the desired result. 
To better understand this result, let us consider two “corner” cases. In particular, notice that if
q = 0 (that is, if no new buyers ever arrive on the market), then
Vk,n(yˆ) =
n
∑
j=k
δj−1(yˆj − yˆj+1)
for all k = 1, . . . , n and any n ∈ N. Thus, the expected payoff to a buyer in this case is the
discounted difference between consecutively ranked valuations. Note that this is also exactly the
externality imposed by the k-th highest buyer on all those ranked below her when there is no
entry, as she postpones each one’s receipt of an object by exactly one period. On the other hand, if
δ = 1 (implying that buyers are “infinitely patient”), then for any q < 1, we have
Vk,n(yˆ) = yˆk
12
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for all k = 1, . . . , n and any n ∈N. In this case, buyers care only about their eventual receipt of an
object, but not about the timing of that event. Therefore, their bids are all equal to zero, and any
random assignment of objects leaves the buyers equally well off.
4.3. Equilibrium
With the characterization derived in Proposition 3, we may now reformulate the bidding strate-
gies from Equation 7 as
(12) βk,n(vi, yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn) = vi −
∫ vi
yˆk+1
λk−1(v′) dv′ −
n
∑
j=k+1
∫ yˆj
yˆj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′.
This expression allows us to demonstrate the properties of bids in the following
PROPOSITION 4 (Information revelation and sequential consistency of βl,k).
The buyers’ bids βk,n, where n ∈ N and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are strictly increasing in each buyers’ own
valuation. Furthermore, when the buyers use these bidding functions, the exit of a lower-ranked bidder does
not induce the immediate exit of any higher-ranked bidders.
Proof. The proof may be found in Appendix A. 
Note that this result verifies our previous assumption that buyers’ values are revealed after
each round—since the bidding functions are strictly increasing in each buyers’ own private valu-
ation, the price at which they drop out of the auction is an invertible function, thereby allowing
the inference of their value by their competitors. Furthermore, since the bidding functions are
“sequentially consistent,” a higher-ranked bidder remains in the auction instead of immediately
exiting after a lower-ranked bidder drops out, thereby allowing the other buyers to (eventually)
deduce their value.
Finally, it remains to be shown that the bidding strategies described are, in fact, an equilibrium
of this model. We demonstrate this in the following
PROPOSITION 5 (Equilibrium verification).
Suppose that in each period, buyers bid according to the cutoff strategies given in Equation 12. This strategy
profile forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential auction game.
Proof. Consider any period with n ∈ N buyers on the market, and fix an arbitrary bidder i. Sup-
pose that all bidders other than i are using the conjectured strategy. We must show that bidder i
has no incentive to make a one-shot deviation from the collection of bidding functions {βk,n}nk=2.
Specifically, we must show that i prefers not to exit an auction either earlier or later than specified.
Note first that if vi < yˆ1, dropping out of the auction early has no effect on future actions
due to the memorylessness of the bidding strategies—in future periods, current actions and the
beliefs they induce are ignored, and the process of information revelation is repeated anew. Hence,
a one-shot deviation to an early exit will not affect the bidding behavior, outcomes, or payoffs
in future periods. On the other hand, suppose that bidder i has the highest realized valuation
among bidders present on the market. Following the conjectured equilibrium leads to a payoff of
yˆ1 − β2,n(yˆ−1), while deviating to an early exit leads to the second-ranked bidder winning and a
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payoff to i of δV1,n−1(yˆ−2). Letting wˆ := (yˆ3, . . . , yˆn), we then have
yˆ1 − β2,n(yˆ2, wˆ)− δV1,n−1(yˆ1, wˆ) = yˆ1 − yˆ2 + δ (V1,n−1(v2, wˆ)−V1,n−1(v1, wˆ))
= yˆ1 − yˆ2 +
(∫ yˆ2
0
λ(v′) dv′ −
∫ yˆ1
0
λ(v′) dv′
)
=
∫ yˆ1
yˆ2
(
1− λ(v′)) dv′ > 0
since yˆ1 > yˆ2 and 0 < λ(v′) < 1 for all v′ ∈ V. Thus, deviating and exiting the auction early leads
to a strict decrease in utility if the realized values are such that bidder i has the highest value, and
does not affect payoffs otherwise.
Of course, bidder i also has the option of remaining active beyond the cutoffs specified by
{βk,n}nk=2. If the realized values are such that vi = yˆ1, delaying exit will have no effect, as the
other bidders will have already dropped out of the auction earlier than i. If, on the other hand,
vi = yˆk for some k > 1, then delaying exit may have an effect on i’s payoffs. To be precise, if i exits
before the eventual winner, her payoff will remain unchanged as behavior in future periods does
not depend upon information already revealed. Thus, in order to influence her payoff, i must win
the auction, remaining active until all other bidders have dropped out. Winning the auction yields
a payoff of yˆk − β2,n(yˆ−k), while following the strategy in Equation 12 leads to an expected payoff
of δVk−1,n−1(yˆ). Letting wˆ := (yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn), we have
yˆk − β2,n(yˆ−k)− δVk−1,n−1(yˆk, wˆ) = yˆk − yˆ1 + δ (V1,n−1(yˆ1, . . . , yˆk−1, wˆ)−Vk−1,n−1(yˆk, wˆ))
= yˆk − yˆ1 +
k−1
∑
j=1
∫ yˆj
yˆj+1
λj(v′) dv′
< yˆk − yˆ1 +
k−1
∑
j=1
(
yˆj − yˆj+1
)
= 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that 0 < λ(v′) < 1 for all v′ ∈ V. Hence, deviating and
exiting the auction later than prescribed has no effect if i has the highest value, but may leads to a
decrease in utility if the realized values are such that vi < yˆ1.
Thus, we may conclude that bidder i has no incentive to make a one-shot deviation regardless
of the realized values; thus, bidding according to Equation 12 is optimal along the equilibrium
path. In order to determine optimality off the equilibrium path, we need to consider the behavior
of bidders after a deviation. Since these post-deviation histories are never reached, we are free
to choose arbitrary off-equilibrium beliefs—Bayes’ rule has no bite in this situation. In particular,
we will suppose that after a deviation, buyers ignore the history of the game and believe that
the deviator is currently truthfully revealing her value in accordance with the bidding functions
{βk,n}nk=2. The arguments used above therefore imply that, with these beliefs, continuing to bid
according to this strategy remains optimal for all agents, including any that may have deviated
in the current or previous periods. Thus, bidding according to Equation 12 is optimal along the
entire game tree, and hence is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential auction game. 
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5. DYNAMIC VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM
Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) develop the dynamic pivot mechanism (also referred to as the
dynamic marginal contribution or dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism), a direct mecha-
nism that implements the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in
which agents receive private information over time. In the mechanism that they propose, agents
receive in each period their marginal contribution to the social welfare in a dynamic generalization
of the standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism. In this mechanism, the truth-telling strategy
is periodic ex post individually rational and incentive compatible.8 Moreover, the authors show
that the sequential ascending auction yields an identical implementation in the case of a schedul-
ing problem with a fixed finite set of independent tasks. Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2007) take
the model one step further, demonstrating that dynamic VCG truthfully implements the socially
efficient allocation in more general dynamic settings. In this section, we show that the equilibrium
in the sequential ascending auction discussed above is equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium
of the dynamic VCG mechanism.
Consider the model examined above in which exactly one object is available for sale in every
period. In this setting, the socially efficient policy is to allocate each object to the buyer with the
highest valuation present on the market.9
Let us define W0 to be the expected value to the social planner at the beginning of a period in
which no buyers are present on the market. Then, letting E[v] denote the expected value of the
distribution F, we may write
W0 = q
∫ v
0
(v′ + δW0) dF(v′) + (1− q)δW0 = q1− δE[v].
Denote by Wn(yˆ) the expected value to the social planner at the beginning of a period when there
are n buyers with values yˆ1 > · · · > yˆn, before the realization of the new buyer arrival process. We
may recursively solve for this function; in particular, we have the following
PROPOSITION 6 (Planner’s payoff function).
The social planner’s expected value at the beginning of a period in which there are n buyers present on the
market with values yˆ1 > · · · > yˆn is given by
(13) Wn(yˆ) = W0 + δ−1
n
∑
j=1
∫ yˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3, and may be found in Appendix A. 
8In dynamic settings with the arrival of new information, the concepts of periodic ex post individual rationality and
incentive compatibility are the natural counterparts of ex post individual rationality and incentive compatibility, as
they account for the possibility of the arrival of additional information in the future.
9Intuitively, since a new object arrives in every period and future entrants’ values are independent of the current state,
there is no benefit to not allocating the object in any particular period. Moreover, allocating an object to a lower-valued
buyer is inefficient due to the fact that the common discount factor δ is smaller than one; therefore, postponing a higher-
valued buyer for the benefit of a lower-valued one is costly. A more formal exposition of this argument may be found
in Appendix B.
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Essentially, this result provides an analogue to the social planner’s payoff in the case of a fixed
number of buyers without any entry. With n buyers whose values are given by yˆ1 > · · · > yˆn, the
efficient allocation yields a value to the planner given by
n
∑
j=1
δj−1vj.
In our setting, however, potential entrants can and do rearrange the ordering of agents in the ef-
ficient allocation, postponing the time at which buyers with lower valuations receive an object.
Thus, their contribution to social welfare must take this effect into account. So, consider the buyer
with the highest valuation yˆ1. If we increase his valuation by an infintesimal amount, the planner
gains an equal amount with probability 1− q(1− F(yˆ1)), the probability that no higher-valued
new entrant arrives. On the other hand, with the complementary probability q(1− F(yˆ1)), assign-
ment of the object to our buyer (and the realization of the planner’s gain) is postponed. Thus, the
benefit from the increase in yˆ1 is
∞
∑
t=0
(δq(1− F(yˆ1)))t (1− q(1− F(yˆ1)) = 1− q(1− F(yˆ1))1− δq(1− F(yˆ1))
= δ−1λ(yˆ1).
Integrating this ratio therefore captures the total contribution of the high-value buyer over a “null”
buyer. Analogous reasoning follows for the remaining (lower-ranked) buyers.
We may then use this result to provide an interpretation for the buyer payoff functions charac-
terized in Proposition 3 by relating the expression for buyer payoffs in Equation 10 to the planner’s
payoff function. In particular, we have the following
PROPOSITION 7 (Relationship between V and W).
For any n ∈ N and any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the expected payoff of the k-th ranked buyer in the sequential
auction game is equal to her marginal contribution to the social welfare; that is,
(14) Vk,n(yˆ) = Wn(yˆ)−Wn−1(yˆ−k).
Proof. Note that we may write
Wn−1(yˆ−k) = W0 + δ−1
k−1
∑
j=1
∫ yˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′ + δ−1
n
∑
j=k+1
∫ yˆj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′.
Straightforward arithmetic then yields
Wn(yˆ)−Wn−1(yˆ−k) =
[
W0 + δ−1
n
∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ yˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′
]
−
[
W0 + δ−1
k−1
∑
j=1
∫ yˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′ + δ−1
n
∑
j=k+1
∫ yˆj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′
]
= δ−1
[
n
∑
j=k
∫ yˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′ −
n
∑
j=k+1
∫ yˆj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′
]
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Combining the two summations, we arrive, as desired, at the definition of Vk,n(yˆ). 
Thus, the marginal contribution of a buyer, and hence their expected payoff in the equilibrium
of the sequential ascending auction game, is exactly the buyer’s marginal contribution to the so-
cial welfare, which is determined by the difference in the scheduling of object assignments to
those bidders who have lower values. Moreover, this demonstrates the equivalence between the
dynamic pivot mechanism and the sequential ascending auction in this setting. Not only are con-
tinuation payoffs identical in the two settings, but the timing of payments and object allocations
are also the same. Thus, the sequential ascending auction serves, in this setting, as a straightfor-
ward and intuitive indirect mechanism that is equivalent to the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism.
6. DISCUSSION
This paper solves for an equilibrium in a model of sequential auctions. In particular, we show
that in sequential ascending auctions, objects can be allocated efficiently in a manner that employs
the truthful revelation of private information. Moreover, the bidding strategy employed by buy-
ers in this equilibrium has the striking property of being robust to the random entry of new buy-
ers whose valuations are private information—in each period, all private information is revealed
anew, and hence there is no incentive for new entrants to attempt to manipulate the outcome of
future periods by altering the information that they (truthfully) reveal upon their entry.
Furthermore, we show that the sequential ascending auction format may be used as an indirect
mechanism for the efficient allocation of goods in a dynamic setting. In particular, the equilib-
rium we characterize preserves the efficiency, individual rationality, and incentive compatibility
of the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism developed and characterized by Bergemann
and Välimäki (2008) and Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2007): the allocations, transfers, and payoffs
of the two mechanisms are identical.
There are several interesting avenues for future research in this area. For example, it would be
desirable to have a fully developed model of seller behavior and competition in “overlapping”
auctions, perhaps applying some of the insights of Peters and Severinov (2006) in a setting with
multiple simultaneously running auctions. Such a setting also allows for the introduction and
study of endogenous arrival and entry deterrence in a manner similar to Nekipelov (2007) but
while accounting for the endogenously determined option value of participating in future auc-
tions.
Another important question regards the usefulness of sequential ascending auctions as an in-
direct mechanism that implements socially efficient policies when agents are not constrained to
have single-unit demand. Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) provide an example that demonstrates
the failure of the sequential ascending auction in implementing the efficient policy in one such
setting; it would be useful to understand how this example may be generalized so as to better
understand when indirect implementation via an auction mechanism is possible. These questions
are, however, left for future work.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
In order to prove Proposition 1, we will make repeated use of the following technical result.
Denote by C(Vn) the set of continuous real-valued functions on Vn. In addition, for any k < n, let
Ck(Vn) ⊆ C(Vn) denote the subset of such functions that do not depend on their first k arguments.
We endow C(Vn) with the sup-metric d∞, where
d∞( f , g) := sup {| f (x)− g(x)| : x ∈ Vn} for all f , g ∈ C(Vn).
This implies that C(Vn) is a complete metric space. We have the following
LEMMA 1 (Ck(Vn) is closed).
For any k ≤ n, Ck(Vn) is a closed subset of C(Vn).
Proof. Fix any convergent sequence { fm}∞m=1 in C(Vn) such that fm ∈ Ck(Vn) for all m ∈ N, and
let f ∗ ∈ C(Vn) denote the (uniform) limit of this sequence. Suppose, however, that f ∗ /∈ Ck(Vn).
Then there exist x, y ∈ Vn such that xi = yi for i = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n, but f ∗(x) 6= f ∗(y). Let
e := | f ∗(x)− f ∗(y)| > 0.
Since fm converges to f ∗, there exists Mx ∈ N such that | fm(x)− f ∗(x)| < e2 for all m > Mx.
Similarly, there exists My ∈ N such that | fm(y)− f ∗(y)| < e2 for all m > My. Therefore, for any
m > max{Mx, My},
e = | f ∗(x)− f ∗(y)| ≤ | f ∗(x)− fm(x)|+ | fm(x)− fm(y)|+ | fm(y)− f ∗(y)|
<
e
2
+ 0+
e
2
= e,
a contradiction. The first inequality above follows from the triangle inequality, and the second is
due to the fact that fm ∈ Ck(Vn) implies fm(x) = fm(y). Therefore, we must have f ∗(x) = f ∗(y);
that is, there are no x, y ∈ Vn such that x and y agree on their last n− k arguments but f ∗(x) 6=
f ∗(y). Thus, we may conclude that f ∗ ∈ Ck(Vn). 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let yˆ ∈ Vn denote the ordered vector of values of those bidders present at
the beginning of the period, and suppose that they are commonly known. Furthermore, suppose
that all buyers use the bidding strategies described in Equation 7. If there are no entrants, then the
highest-valued buyer (without loss of generality, bidder 1) wins the object, and pays the price
β2,n(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn) = yˆ2 − δV1,n−1(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn).
On the other hand, if a new entrant enters with value v′, bidder 1 may no longer win the object.
Furthermore, even if she does win, the price she pays will depend upon the realization of v′. In
particular, we may write the expected payoff of bidder 1 as
V1,n(yˆ) = (1− q) [yˆ1 − β2,n(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn)]
+ q
[
n−1
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
(
yˆ1 − β2,n+1( ˆˆy−1(v′))
)
dF(v′) +
∫ v
yˆ1
δV1,n(yˆ) dF(v′)
]
,
(A.1)
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where ˆˆy(v′) is the ordered vector of values including the new entrant, and we define yˆn+1 := 0.
The first term (multiplied by 1− q) is bidder 1’s payoff when no entrant arrives, while the second
term is the (probability-weighted) sum of the payoffs for each possible realized ranking of the new
entrant.
Substituting the definition of β2,n and β2,n+1 from Equation 7 and simplifying, we see that V1,n
is given by the fixed point of the operator T1,n : C(Vn)→ C(Vn) defined by
[T1,n(W)](yˆ) := (1− q) [yˆ1 − yˆ2 + δV1,n−1(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn))]
+ q
[ ∫ yˆ1
0
yˆ1 dF(v′)−
∫ yˆ2
0
yˆ2 dF(v′)−
∫ yˆ1
yˆ2
v′ dF(v′)
+ δ
n−1
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
W( ˆˆy−1(v′)) dF(v′) +
∫ v
yˆ1
δW(yˆ) dF(v′)
]
.
(A.2)
Fix any W, W ′ ∈ C(Vn) such that W ≥W ′. Then
[T1,n(W)− T1,n(W ′)](yˆ) = δq
[
n−1
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
[W −W ′]( ˆˆy−1(v′)) dF(v′)
+(1− F(yˆ1))[W −W ′](yˆ)
]
≥ 0.
In addition, for any W ∈ C(Vn) and any α ∈ R++,
[T1,n(W + α)](yˆ) = [T1,n(W)](yˆ) + δqα.
Thus, T1,n satisfies the monotonicity and discounting conditions of Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma,
and hence we may apply the Banach Fixed Point Theorem to show that V1,n is the unique fixed
point of T1,n.10
Now consider V2,n. Suppose (again without loss of generality) that bidder 1 has the second-
highest of the n values; that is, that v1 = yˆ2. If there are no new entrants, then bidder 1 loses
the auction, but has the highest value in the next period. On the other hand, if a new entrant
arrives, bidder 1 will still lose the auction. However, in the next period, her ranking depends on
the realization of the new entrant’s value. Thus, we may write her payoff as the fixed point of the
operator T2,n : C(Vn)→ C(Vn) defined by
[T2,n(W)](yˆ) := δ(1− q)V1,n−1(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn) + q
[
n−2
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
δV1,n( ˆˆy−1(v′)) dF(v′)
+
∫ yˆ1
yˆ2
δW( ˆˆy−1(v′)) dF(v′) +
∫ v
yˆ1
δW(yˆ) dF(v′)
]
.
(A.3)
Applying exactly the same technique and steps as with T1,n, we see that T2,n is a contraction map-
ping on C(Vn). Notice that T2,n in fact maps elements of C1(Vn) into C1(Vn) itself; thus, applying
Lemma 1, the unique fixed point of T2,n does not depend upon its first argument. We may there-
fore, with a slight abuse of notation, write V2,n(yˆ) = V2,n(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn).
10See Section C.6 of Ok (2007) for precise statements of the results we are applying.
19
MAHER SAID
Now consider any arbitrary k such that 1 < k ≤ n, and suppose that Vk−1,n ∈ Ck−2(Vn). Then
Vk,n is given by a fixed point of the operator Tk,n : C(Vn)→ C(Vn), where Tk,n is defined by
[Tk,n(W)](yˆ) := δ(1− q)Vk−1,n−1(yˆk, . . . , yˆn) + q
[
n−k
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
δVk−1,n( ˆˆy−1(v′)) dF(v′)
+
n−1
∑
j=n−k+1
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
δW( ˆˆy−1(v′)) dF(v′) +
∫ v
yˆ1
δW(yˆ) dF(v′)
]
.
(A.4)
We may again apply Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point Theorem to
show that Vk,n is the unique fixed point of Tk,n. Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that
Tk,n maps elements of Ck−1(Vn) into Ck−1(Vn). Therefore, again using Lemma 1, we may write
Vk,n(yˆ) = Vk,n(yˆk, . . . , yˆn).
Thus, by induction, the bidding strategies in Equation 7 lead to unique value functions Vk,n such
that, for all n and all k = 1, . . . , n, Vk,n ∈ Ck−1(Vn). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall from Equation A.2 in the proof of Proposition 1 that V1,n is defined as
the unique fixed point of T1,n. Letting wˆ := yˆ−1 = (yˆ2, yˆ3, . . . , yˆn), we have
V1,n(yˆ2, wˆ) = [T1,n(V1,n)](yˆ2, wˆ) = δ(1− q)V1,n−1(wˆ)
+ δq
[
n−2
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
V1,n( ˆˆw(v′)) dF(v′) +
∫ v
yˆ2
δV1,n(wˆ) dF(v′)
]
.
However, this is identical to the definition of T2,n given in Equation A.3, implying that, for all
n ∈N,
V2,n(wˆ) = V1,n(yˆ2, wˆ).
Fix k > 1, and suppose that Vk,n(yˆk, yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn) = Vk−1,n(yˆk, yˆk, yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn) for all n ≥ k.
Redefine wˆ := (yˆk+1, yˆk+2, . . . , yˆn), and consider Vk,n(yˆk+1, wˆ). Recalling from Equation A.4 the
definition of Tk,n, we have
Vk,n(yˆk+1, wˆ) = [Tk,n(Vk,n)](yˆk+1, wˆ) = δ(1− q)Vk−1,n−1(wˆ)
+ q
[
n−k
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
δVk−1,n( ˆˆw(v′)) dF(v′)
+
n−1
∑
j=n−k+1
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
δVk,n( ˆˆw(v′)) dF(v′) +
∫ v
yˆ1
δVk,n(wˆ) dF(v′)
]
.
Taking into account the fact that the fixed point of this operator lies in Ck(Vn) allows us to rewrite
the above as
Vk,n(yˆk+1, wˆ) = δ(1− q)Vk,n−1(wˆ) + q
[
n−k−1
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
δVk,n( ˆˆw(v′)) dF(v′) +
∫ v
yˆk+1
δVk,n(wˆ) dF(v′)
]
.
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Notice that the above is a reformulation of the expression for Tk+1,n. Since Vk,n(wˆ) is a fixed point
of the operator, the uniqueness result from Proposition 1 implies that
Vk+1,n(wˆ) = Vk,n(yˆk+1, wˆ)
for all n ≥ k + 1. Thus, by induction on k, we have established that
Vk,n(yˆk, . . . , yˆn) = V1,n(yˆk, . . . , yˆk, yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn)
for arbitrary n ∈N and for all k = 1, . . . , n. 
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove the first part of this result, it suffices to simply differentiate the bid
function βk,n with respect to the bidder’s own value vi. In particular, we have, for all n ∈ N and
k = 1, . . . , n,
∂
∂vi
βk,n(vi, yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn) = 1− λl−1(vi).
However, 0 < λ(v) < 1 for all v ∈ V, and so ∂∂vi βk,n(vi, yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn) > 0.
As for the second claim, let wˆ := (yˆk+1, . . . , yˆn) and note that
βk,n(vi, wˆ)− βk+1,n(wˆ) = vi − δVk−1,n−1(vi, wˆ)− yˆk+1 + δVk,n−1(wˆ)
= vi − yˆk+1 − δ (V1,n−1(vi, . . . , vi, wˆ)−V1,n−1(yˆk+1, . . . , yˆk+1, wˆ))
= vi − yˆk+1 −
∫ vi
yˆk+1
λk(v′) dv′
=
∫ vi
yˆk+1
(
1− λk(v′)
)
dv′.
Since 0 < λ(v′) < 1 for all v′ ∈ V, this expression is positive if, and only if, vi > yˆk+1. Thus, the
exit of a lower-ranked bidder does not induce the immediate exit of a higher-ranked bidder who
is using the bidding strategy given in Equation 12. 
Proof of Proposition 6. We begin by showing that W1 has the desired form and then proceed induc-
tively. Note that W1 is a fixed point of the operator Tˆ1 : C(V)→ C(V) defined by
(A.5) [Tˆ(g)](x) := (1− q)(x + δW0) + q
[∫ x
0
(x + δg(y)) dF(y) +
∫ v
x
(y + δg(x)) dF(y)
]
.
This operator is clearly a self-map from C(V) into itself. Furthermore, it is straightforward to see
that Tˆ1 is a contraction. Fix any g, g′ ∈ C(V) such that g′ > g. Then
[Tˆ1(g′ − g)](x) = δq
[∫ x
0
(g′(y)− g(y)) dF(y) + (1− F(x))(g′(x)− g(x))
]
> 0.
Furthermore, for any g ∈ C(V) and any α ∈ R++,
[Tˆ1(g + α)](x) = [Tˆ1(g)](x) + δqα.
Since δq < 1, we may apply Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point Theorem,
implying that Tˆ1 has a unique fixed point W1 such that
W1(yˆ1) = (1− q)(yˆ1 + δW0) + q
[∫ yˆ
0
(yˆ + δW1(v′)) dF(v′) +
∫ v
yˆ
(v′ + δW1(yˆ)) dF(v′)
]
.
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Differentiating this expression with respect to yˆ1 yields
W ′1(yˆ1) = (1− q) + qF(yˆ1) + δq(1− F(yˆ))W ′1(yˆ) = δ−1λ(yˆ1).
Finally, note that W1(0) = W0, since a buyer with value zero adds nothing to the social welfare.
Since the continuity of F implies the continuity of W ′1, we may apply the Fundamental Theorem
of Calculus, yielding
(A.6) W1(yˆ1) = W0 + δ−1
∫ yˆ1
0
λ(v′) dv′.
Now consider Wn(yˆ) for arbitrary n > 1, and suppose that Wn−1 takes the desired form.11 Wn
is defined to be a fixed point of the operator Tˆn : C(Vn)→ C(Vn) given by
[Tˆn(g)](x) := (1− q)(x1 + δWn−1(x−1))
+ q
[ n−1
∑
j=0
∫ xn−j
xn−j+1
(x1 + δg(x2, . . . , xn−j, y, xn−j+1, . . . , xn)) dF(y)
+
∫ v
x1
(y + δg(x)) dF(y)
]
.
(A.7)
Note that for any g, g′ ∈ C(Vn) such that g′ > g, we have
[Tˆn(g′ − g)](x) = δq
[ n−1
∑
j=0
∫ xn−j
xn−j+1
[g′ − g](x2, . . . , xn−j, y, xn−j+1, . . . , xn) dF(y)
+ (1− F(x1)(g′(x)− g(x))
]
> 0.
Furthermore, for any g ∈ C(Vn) and any α ∈ R++,
[Tˆn(g + α)](x) = [Tˆn(g)](x) + δqα.
Since δq < 1, Blackwell’s monotonicity and discounting conditions are satisfied. Thus, Blackwell’s
Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point Theorem imply that Tˆn has a unique fixed point
Wn such that
Wn(yˆ) = (1− q)(yˆ1 + δWn−1(yˆ−1))
+ q
[ n−1
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
(yˆ1 + δWn(yˆ2, . . . , yˆn−j, v′, yˆn−j+1, . . . , yˆn)) dF(v′)
+
∫ v
yˆ1
(v′ + δWn(yˆ)) dF(v′)
]
.
(A.8)
Differentiating this expression implicitly with respect to yˆ1 yields
W(1)n (yˆ) = (1− q) + qF(yˆ1) + δq(1− F(yˆ1))W(1)n (yˆ) = δ−1λ(yˆ1).
Note that this expression is independent of n and of yˆj for j 6= 1, implying that W(1,j)n is identically
zero for all j 6= 1.
11Notice that this implies that all of the cross-derivatives of Wn−1 are identically zero.
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Similarly, implicit differentiation with respect to yˆ2 yields
W(2)n (yˆ) = δ(1− q)W(1)n−1(yˆ−1) + δq
[ n−2
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
W(1)n ( ˆˆy−1(v′)) dF(v′)
+
∫ yˆ1
yˆ2
W(2)n (v′, yˆ) dF(v′) + (1− F(yˆ1))W(2)n (yˆ)
]
,
where ˆˆy(v′) is the re-ordering of yˆ and v′. Since W(1,j)n is identically zero,
n−2
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
W(1)n ( ˆˆy−1(v′)) dF(v′) = δ−1λ(yˆ2)F(yˆ2).
Furthermore, W(2,1)n = 0 implies that∫ yˆ1
yˆ2
W(2)n (v′, yˆ) dF(v′) + (1− F(yˆ1))W(2)n (yˆ) = (1− F(yˆ2))W(2)n (yˆ).
Thus, making use of the fact that W(1)n−1(yˆ−1) = δ
−1λ(yˆ2), we may conclude that
(A.9) W(2)n = (1− q)λ(yˆ2) + qF(yˆ2)λ(yˆ2) + δq(1− F(yˆ2))W(2)n (yˆ) = δ−1λ2(yˆ2).
Once again, note that this expression is independent of n and of yˆj for j 6= 2, implying that W2,jn is
identically zero for all j 6= 2.
Proceeding inductively, consider the derivative of Wn with respect to its k-th argument, where
k ≤ n. We have
W(k)n (yˆ) = (1− q)δW(k−1)n−1 (yˆ−1) + δq
[ n−k
∑
j=0
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
W(k−1)n ( ˆˆy−1(v′)) dF(v′)
+
n−1
∑
j=n−k+1
∫ yˆn−j
yˆn−j+1
W(k)n ( ˆˆy1(v′)) dF(v′) + (1− F(yˆ1))W(k)n (yˆ)
]
.
Applying the same simplifications as above, along with our inductive hypothesis that W(k−1)n−1 (yˆ−1) =
δ−1λk−1(yˆk), we have
W(k)n (yˆ) = (1− q)W(k−1)n−1 (yˆ−1) + qF(yˆk)W(k−1)n−1 (yˆ−1) + δq(1− F(yˆk))W(k)n (yˆ)
= δ−1λk(yˆk).(A.10)
Finally, note that Wn(0, . . . , 0) = W0 since, as with a single buyer with value zero, “null” agents
provide no social benefit. By induction on n, we may then conclude that
(A.11) Wn(yˆ) = W0 + δ−1
n
∑
j=1
∫ yˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′
for all n ∈N and all yˆ ∈ Vn. 
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APPENDIX B. SOCIALLY EFFICIENT POLICY
In this appendix, we demonstrate that the socially efficient policy in the setting with random
object availability is that which allocates an object to the highest-valued buyer currently present
on the market whenever an object is available. The argument for the case in which objects arrive in
every period is subsumed by the present discussion, and therefore is is not explicitly considered.
B.1. Preliminaries
Denote the period-t state space of the planner’s problem by Ω := Ω1 ×Ω2, where
(B.1) Ω1 := {0, 1} and Ω2 := {S ⊂ Z×V : |S| < ∞, (0, 0) ∈ S} .
The interpretation of these states is straightforward: an object is available for assignment in period
t if, and only if, ωt1 = 1; and we denote by ω
t
2 ∈ Ω2 the set of buyers and their valuations present
on the market in period t. Note that we require |ωt2| < ∞ since there may only be a finite number
of buyers present at any time. Thus, buyer i ∈ Z, with value vi ∈ V, is present on the market in
period t if, and only if, (i, vi) ∈ ωt2. Note that we will be indexing buyers by their period of arrival,
so that buyer t is the buyer who may arrive in period t. Buyers that are present on the market in the
initial period, however, will be denoted by negative indices.12 Finally, we will always assume that
a “null” agent with value zero, denoted by (0, 0), is always present—this null agent will represent
the act of “discarding” an object and not assigning it to a buyer.
Given a state ωt, the planner must choose an action at ∈ A(ωt), where
A(ωt) :=
ωt2, if ωt1 = 1;{(0, 0)}, if ωt1 = 0.
Thus, if an object is available in period t (when ωt1 = 1), the planner may choose to allocate the
object to any of the available agents or to the null agent. On the other hand, if ωt1 = 0, there is no
object available, leaving the planner with no possible action but to “allocate” to the null agent.
Recall that the arrival processes of both buyers and objects are history independent. In particu-
lar, the seller arrivals are independently and identically distributed according to
Pr
(
ωt+11 = 1
)
:= p = 1− Pr
(
ωt+11 = 0
)
for all t.
On the other hand, the buyers available in the next period depends on both the current period
allocation and the action taken. Letting ξt ⊂ Ξ := N×R+ denote the realization of the buyer
arrival process in period t, we have
ξt :=
{(0, 0), (t, vt)}, with probability q;{(0, 0)}, with probability 1− q,
where vt is drawn independently from the distribution F and is unknown to the planner until
buyer t is present on the market. Note that the arrival process always includes the “null” agent
12For instance, if 2 buyers are present at the beginning of the game (in period 0), then they will be referred to as buyers
−2 and −1, with values v−2 and v−1, respectively.
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(0, 0), reflecting the planner’s option in each period to not allocate an object. We may therefore
define a state transition function τ : Ω× A(Ω)× Ξ→ Ω2 by
ωt+12 = τ(ω
t, at, ξt+1) :=
(
ωt2 \ {at}
)⋃
ξt+1.
Thus, given an initial state ω0 = (ω01,ω
0
2), the planner’s problem may be written as
(B.2) max
{at}∞t=1
{
Eξ
[
∞
∑
t=1
δt−1ωt1a
t
]}
subject to at ∈ A(ωt),ωt+12 = τ(ωt, at, ξt+1) for all t ∈N.
B.2. Solution
We define the set of period t arrival histories as
H0 := {(ω01,ω02)}, andHt := Ht−1 × (Ω1 × Ξ) for all t ∈N.
The set of all possible histories is then H := ⋃∞t=0Ht. We will say that a history h ∈ H precedes a
history h′ ∈ H if h is a prefix of h′, and will denote this by h→ h′.
Note that given a history ht =
(
(ω01,ω
0
2), (ω
1
2, ξ
1), . . . , (ωt2, ξ
t)
)
and a sequence of feasible ac-
tions at−1 =
(
a1, a2, . . . , at−1
)
, we may reconstruct the resultant state ωt by repeated application
of the state transition function τ. We will use the notational shorthand ωˆ(ht, at−1) for this state.
Thus, we may define an allocation policy as a function a : H → A(Ω) such that, for all t ∈ N and
ht = (ht−1, (ξt,ωt2)),
a(ht) ∈ A
(
ωˆ
(
ht, at−1(ht−1)
))
,
where at−1(ht−1) is the sequence of allocation decisions taken earlier in the policy.
LEMMA 2 (Socially Efficient Policy).
The policy a∗ which always allocates an object (when available) to the highest-valued buyer present maxi-
mizes the social planner’s objective function.13
Proof. Fix any policy a0 6= a∗ such that a0 yields a the planner a strictly higher payoff than the
policy a∗, and define
(B.3) Hˆ0 :=
{
h ∈ H : a0(h) 6= a∗(h) and a0(h′) = a∗(h′) for all h′ → h
}
.
Note that Hˆ0 is the set of all histories h such that a∗ and a0 disagree at h but agree on all its
prefixes—it is the set of “first disagreements” between a∗ and a0. Since a0 does strictly better than
a∗, this set must have nonzero measure (with respect to the measure induced by the arrival process
ξ), as otherwise the two policies would agree almost everywhere.
For each h ∈ Hˆ0, define
(B.4) i0(h) := a∗(h) and I0(h) :=
{
h′ ∈ H : h→ h′ and a0(h′) = i(h)
}
.
13Thanks are due to Larry Samuelson for suggesting the method of proof used below.
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Thus, I0(h) is the set of histories (possibly empty) at which policy a0 eventually allocates an object
to the buyer who had the highest value at h. Letting
Iˆ0 :=
⋃
h∈Hˆ0
I0(h),
we may define, for each h ∈ I0, hˆ0(h) to be the element of Hˆ0 such that hˆ0(h)→ h.
With these definitions in mind, we may define a new allocation policy
(B.5) a1(h) :=

i0(h), if h ∈ Hˆ0;
a0(hˆ0(h)), if h ∈ Iˆ0;
a0(h), otherwise.
Thus, a1 is identical to a0 except that it “swaps” the allocation decisions at histories h ∈ Hˆ0 with
those at histories I0(h). Since the value of the agent associated with i0(h) is greater than that of the
agent associated with a0(h) for all h ∈ Hˆ0, this implies that a1 yields the planner a strictly greater
payoff than a0. To see this, consider any v > v′, and t < t′. Since δ < 1,
(δtv + δt
′
v′)− (δtv′ + δt′v) = (δt − δt′)(v− v′) > 0.
Such a gain is realized for every history in Hˆ0. Since this set has positive measure, it must be the
case that the planner’s payoff increases.
Notice that if a1 yields the planner a payoff less than or equal to that of a∗, transitivity of the
planner’s payoffs leads to a contradiction, implying that there does not exist a policy a0 such that
a0 does strictly better than a∗, and hence that a∗ is optimal. So suppose, on the other hand, that a1
does provide a strictly higher payoff than a∗. We may then define
(B.6) Hˆ1 :=
{
h ∈ H : a1(h) 6= a∗(h) and a1(h′) = a∗(h′) for all h′ → h
}
.
Since a1 is better than a∗, Hˆ1 must have nonzero measure. For each h ∈ Hˆ1, define
i1(h) := a∗(h), I1(h) :=
{
h′ ∈ H : h→ h′ and a1(h′) = i(h)
}
, and Iˆ1 :=
⋃
h∈Hˆ1
I1(h).
For each h ∈ I1, let hˆ1(h) be the element of Hˆ1 such that hˆ1(h)→ h. Define
(B.7) a2(h) :=

i1(h), if h ∈ Hˆ1;
a1(hˆ1(h)), if h ∈ Iˆ1;
a1(h), otherwise.
As before, a2 is identical to a1 except that it “swaps” the allocation decisions at histories h ∈ Hˆ1
with those at histories I1(h), leading to a gain along the path of each history. Such a gain is realized
at every history in Hˆ1, and since this set has positive measure, it must be the planner realizes a
payoff gain by switching from a1 to a2.
If a2 yields the planner a payoff less than or equal to that of a∗, transitivity of the planner’s
payoffs leads to a contradiction, implying that there does not exist a policy a0 such that a0 does
strictly better than a∗, and hence that a∗ is optimal.
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Proceeding inductively in this manner, we either arrive at a contradiction or we construct a
sequence of policies {at}∞t=1 with strictly increasing payoffs {νt}∞t=1. Note, however, that for all
t ∈ N, each at agrees with a∗ on at least all histories h ∈ Ht−1. Since δt approaches zero as t
becomes increasingly large and values are bounded above, this implies that this
(B.8) lim
t→∞ νt → ν
∗,
where ν∗ is the expected payoff to the planner from following allocation policy a∗. Moreover, since
the sequence {νt}∞t=1 is increasing, this implies that
(B.9) ν∗ ≥ νt for all t ∈N,
a contradiction. It must then be the case that there does not exist a policy a0 that yields the planner
a strictly higher expected payoff than a∗. Therefore, we may conclude that a∗ is, in fact, a socially
optimal policy. 
Note that at the ex ante stage, other policies may do as well as a∗ in terms of the planner’s
payoffs; however, using the same “swapping” argument as above, one may show that the set of
histories at which such a policy disagrees with a∗ must be of measure zero. This implies that a∗ is
the unique socially efficient policy when optimality is desired after every history.
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